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INTRODUCTION
Since 2010, the European Union has watched a global
financial crisis develop into a European sovereign debt crisis.'
Governmental support of financial institutions imposed strains
on public finances, 2 which led the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") to warn of the need for structural reforms. Austerity
measures have been imposed as a condition of financial support
from the European Union and the IMF.' But despite a number
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. See EUROPEAN CLNTRAL BANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY RLVILW 9 (2010), availableat

http://ww .ecb.int/pub/pdi other/inancialstbilit 7reviev20 lo l 2en.pdf ("The main
source of concern stems from the interplay between sovereign debt problems and
vulnerabilities in segments of the euro area banking sector.").
2. See INT'L MONLTARY FUND, GLOBAMAFINANCIAL STABILITY RLPORT: MELTJ(, NLW
CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER YSTEM, at xi (20 10) ("A key concern
is that room for poliw mancutvers in many advanced economies has eithcr been
exhausted or become much more limited. Moreover, sovereign risks in advanced
economies could undermine financial stability gains and extend the crisis. The rapid
increase in public debt and deterioration of fiscal balance sheets could be transmitted
back to banking systems or across borders.").
3. See id.at xiv.

4. See Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, Joint Statement on Greece by EU
Commissioner 011i Rehn and IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (May 2,
2010), available at http:/i/wv.imforg/externalinp/secipri2010/prlO177.htm; see
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of official interventions designed to promote confidence and
maintain financial stability, the European Union's sovereign
debt crisis has persisted into 2012.' As a result, European
politicians can claim that European citizens are bearing the cost
of failures in the financial system,' and that one of the problems
with the way in which governments have sought to address the
interlinked financial crises is that they have ignored EU
requirements of transparency and accountability.
In national and transnational governance, the language of
transparency is unavoidable,' although the meaning of
also Manos MaWsaganis, The
lfare State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece. 21 J. EUR. SOC.
POt'Y 501, 505-06 (2011) (describing Greek pension reform).
5. See Econ. & Fin. Aftairs, European C(omm'n, Statcment by Vice-President Olli
Rehn on the Decision by S&P Concerning the Rating of Several Euro Area Member
States (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy linance /articlesi
govcrnance/2012-01-13-rehn en.htm,. Failure to solve Europe's crisis has implications
for the rest of the world. See Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Intl Monetary Fund,
Speech: Global Challenges in 2012 cOan. 23, 2012), available at http:/iwwwimforg/
extcrnal/np/spccchcs/ 2012/012312.1!tm ("But what we must all understand is that
this is a defining moment. Itis not about saving any one country or region. It is about
saving the world from a downward economic spiral. It is about avoiding a 1930s
moment, in which inaction, insularity, and rigid ideology combine to cause a collapse
in global demand. The longer we wait, the worse it will get. The only solution isto
move forward together. Our collective economic future depends on it.").

6. See Martin Schulz, Inaugural Speech by Martin Schulz Following His Election as
President
of tie European
Parliament
(Jan.
17.
2012),
available at
http: /iwwv.europari.europa.eu
ithe-presidenti enipress /pressreleasespeeches/
specches/sp-2012/sp-2012-january/spccclics-2012-january-.1html ("As a result of the
economic crisis, in many countries poverty is on the increase and uncmployimcnt has
reached disastrous levels among young people in particular. They are now taking to
Europe's streets to protest against an economic system which allows a small minority to
rake in tihe profits when times arc good, and tores society as a whole to bear the losses
when times are bad; a system whose workings might lead a dispassionate observer to
conclude that anonyimous ratings agencies in New York are more powerful than
democratically elected governments and parliaments. This crisis
of confidence in
politics and its institutions is also undermining faith in the European integration
proccss.").
7. See id. ("For months now the Union has been stumbling from one crisis
summit

to another. Decisions which aflect us all are being taken by heads of government
behind closed doors. To my mind, this is a reversion to a torm of European politics
which I thought had been consigned to the histol) books: it is reminisccnt of tcie
era of
the Congress of Vienna in the 19th century, when Europe's leaders were ruthless in
their defence of national interests and dcmocratic scrutiny was simply unheard of.").

8. See, e.g.,
Christopher Hood, Accoantabiit
c: Siamese Twins,
3 , and Transparen
Watchir-g Parts or Awkward Couple?, 33 W. Lt R. P01- 989, 990 (2010) ("[T]he word
transparency started to become a central doctrine of good governance for both firms
and states fromn the 1990s, and indeed seemed to be reaching satluration coverage by

the 2000s."); Trasparer

Jy Key toAccourtability, INT'I MONETARY FUND (Jan. 11, 2010),
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transparency varies in different contexts,' and policies that are
said to be designed to achieve transparency may not in fact
succeed
in
achieving
communication,l
let
alone
accountability.1 Within the European Union, transparency is
seen as a component of accountability, 2 and as one way of
addressing the European Union's democratic deficit.' EU
discussions about the need for increased transparency have
moved from a focus on the European Commission
("Commission") at the time of the Maastricht Treaty 4 to a
http:/iwwv.imfiorgiexternalipiexrics/iews/20 I)cso I 10 htm ( ("Greater
transparency in the [International Monetary Fund's] policies and decisions makes it
more accountable to the people and governments at the center of its wvork, the
organization concluded after a policy rcview."); see also Transparency and Open
Governnint, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009). See generally Memorandun for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Open Government Directive
(Dec. 8, 2009), available at htIIp://
w.whitchouse.gov/sitcs/default/files/omb/
assts /micioranda_2010/10()-06.pdf
9. See Mark Bevir, Public Administration as Stopy'elling, 89 Pt'B. ADMIN. 183, 188
(2011) ("Our beliefs, concepts, actions, and practices are products of particular
traditions or discourses. Social concepts (and social objects), such as 'bureaucracy' or
'democracy', do not have intrinsic properties and objective boundaries. They are
artificial inventions of particular languages and societies. Their content varies with the
wider webs of belief in which they are situated.").
10. See Onora O'Neill, EthicsfJr Communication, 17 ElR.J.PHIL. 167, 170 (2009)
("Transparency counters secrecy, but it does not ensr c comnunication.").
11. See Hood, supra note 8,at 989 ("Accountability broadly denotes the duLy of an
individual or organisation to answer in some way about how they have conducted their
aftairs. Transparency broadly means the conduct of business in a fashion that makes
decisions, rules and other inforination visible flom outside.").
12. See juliet ILodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitima, 32 J.COMMON MKT.
STUD. 343, 353 (1994) ("Transparency, democracy and subsidiarity are seen as handinaidens."). The duty to give reasons is a longstanding ranspareincy-enhancing
component of EU law that is not addressed in this Essay. See Bo Vesterdor,
Transparenm-Not just a Vogue Word, 22 FORDHAM INT'I L.J. 902, 903-06 (1998)
(discussing the duty to give reasons).
13. See Giandomenico Majone, The Reglatoy State and ItsLegitimcey Problems, 22
W. E R.PoL. 1, 8-9 (1999) (writing that "the supranational institutions of the Union
cannot be legitimated by proxy, but must establish their own autonomuous legitimacy,
either through electoral channels (the case of the European Parliaments), or by other
procedural and substantive means"). For Maijon, transparency isan aspect of such
legitimation. See id.
at 13.
14. See, e.g.,
Lodge, supra note 12, at 346 ("The transparency of decision-making
was put onto the political agenda officially by those who had spent decades denying the
need for it: the member govcrnenints. The [European Commission ("Commission")]
became the usual scapegoat for government wanton disregard of the fact that together,
acting as [the Council of the European Union ("Council"), they acted as the
[European Conrnufli[y's] legislature but not in a manner of the presumed openness
characteristic of liberal democratic parliamentary regimes but of a closed, secretive,
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greater and more generalized emphasis on transparency as an
15
aspect of European governance under the Treaty of Lisbon.
But although the Treaty of Lisbon established a commitment to
transparency,
the contours of that commitment are
controversial." s The European Union continues to develop its
system for making lobbying more transparent." Progress on a
proposed amendment to the EU regulation on access to
documents to implement the Treaty of Lisbon has been slow,"8

unaccountable system."); f john Peterson, Phirg the Tra, pa#ency Game: Consultation
and Poliq-!aking in the European Commissio., 73 PUB. ADMIIN. 473, 480 (1995) ("The
Commission's broader inf)rmation policy objectives were pur suted in negotiations with
the [European Parliament] and Council on the October 1993 inter-institutional
declaration on 'Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity.' The blandness of the
agreed text masked intense institutional recriminations. Commission and [European
Parliament] officials accused the Council of paying lip service to transparency while
refusing to take maningful steps to open up its own activities.")
15. See Consolidated Version of the Trta) on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 15, 2010 O1. C 83/47, at 54-55 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 10, 11. 2010 OJ. C 83/13, at 20-21
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. Some argue that developments in EU law promote
transparency in the Member States. See R. I)aniel Kelemen, Eurolegalism and Democracy,
50 J. COMNION MKT. STUD. 55, 56 (2012) ("Across a wide range of policy areas, the
process of European integration is undermining traditionally co-optrativt, intormal
and opaque approaches to regulation at the national level and replacing them with EUlevel regulatory regimes that rely more on tormal, transparent legal norins backed by
more aggressive public enforcement and expanded opportunities for private
enforcement litigation.").
16. See, e.g., Tinne Heremans, 'Optimal' Versus Alaximal' Public Access to Documents:
A Brief Note on EU Case Law, ELR. POLY BRILF, Sept. 2011, available at
http:i/ww .egmontinstitute.beipapers/ 1 ieur/EPB4.pdf, cf Susana Borrds & Anders
Ejrnrs, The Legitimacy of New MWodes of Governance in the EU Studying National
Stakeholders' Support, 12 ELR. UNION POL. 107, 108-09 (2011) ("Normative scholars
have shown that the new modes of governance in the EU tend not to comply with the
standards set up by normative theories of rtpresentativt democracy, and that they also
fall short of the normative dtmocratic ideals of participation and deliberation.").
17. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Have a Bigger Say in European PolicyMaking: Commission Extends Public Consultations to 12 Weeks and Creates New 'Alert
Service' Jan. 3, 2012) ("The Commission has also introduced an alert service for
upcoming initiatives: Organisations that sign up for the Transparency Register, can
subscribe to this alert service to get early information on the roadinaps for new
initiatives in their fields of interest about one year betore there [sic] adoption.").
18. See European Commission, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 Regarding Public Access to
European Parliament. Council and Commission Documents: Proposal, COM (2011)
137 Final, 5 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Public Access Regulation] ("More
than one year after the entry into torce of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is still no
perspective tor the adoption of a new Regulation regarding public access to documntus
that will replace Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The discussions in the European
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and attempts to discover the negotiating positions that the
different Member States have adopted regarding the proposed
new access-to-documents rules encountered opposition in the
Council of the European Union ("Council")." 9
Progress towards transparency may be slow, but the
European Union's post-Lisbon commitment to transparency
means that claims that the European Union's response to the
financial and sovereign debt crises has been opaque cannot be
ignored. At the same time, it is clear that it is particularly
difficult to achieve transparency with respect to urgent matters
such as the financial and sovereign debt crises, not to mention
complex, or at least intricate, issues such as financial regulation.
20
Urgency and complexity make transparency harder to achieve,
but managing crises of sovereign debt and financial regulation
are not the only areas of EU policymaking that are affected by
urgency and complexity. Evidence from these policy areas of
weaknesses in the European Union's transparency regime has
implications for transparency more generally.
I. TRANSPARENCYIN THE EUROPEAN ULION
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

("TFEU")

provides

that

"[iun

order

to

promote

good

governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the
Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct

Parliament and the Council have shown strongly diverging views about amending the
Regulation.").
19. See, e.g , Access Infb Fur. v. Council of the European Union, Case T-233/09,
[2011] E.C .R. 11
(delivered on Mar. 22, 2011) (not yet reported) (annulling thre
Council's refusal to provide access to documents relating to a proposal for a regulation
relating to public access to documents of the European Parliament, Council, and
Commission).
20. For a suggestion that transparency may be problematic in

the Contest of
attempts to resolve potential military crises, see Bernard 1. Finel & Kristin M. ILord, The
Suprising Logic of Transparen,. 43 iNT'I STUD. Q. 315 (1999). The authors argue that
transparcncy may increase noise. See id. at 336 (" [T]he shcer availability of inforination

is far less important than its correct interpretation. Since transparency, by itself, may
confuse observers by illuminating so many mixed messages, it is important to identif,
thirough diplomacy and intelligence, which voices speak the government's position
authoritatively and which do not. The policy implications of this conclusion are that
hunian assessments of intelligence remain valuable, and may become even more so in
tie futLure as the revolution
information available.").

in

communications

technolotgy

makes

even more
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their work as openly as possible."'2 The idea that institutions
should operate as openly as possible involves holding meetings
that are publicly accessibe, 22 and making documents available to
the public. ' The right of access to documents should now
extend to all EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies,
although its application to the Court of Justice of the European
Union ("Court of Justice" or "Court"), the European Central
Bank, and the European Investment Bank is limited.2 4 The
TFEU thus identifies two specific mechanisms of transparency
(open meetings and public access to documents), as well as two
objectives openness should help to achieve (good governance
and citizen participation). The Treaty on European Union
("TEU") guarantees citizens the right to participate in the
democratic life of the Union,25 and to be involved in
consultations about the development of policy in the European
Union.26 Although some commentators have argued that the

2 1.TFEU, supra note

15, art. 15 (1), 2010 (.J.C 83, at 54.
22. See id.art. 15(2), at 54 ("The European Parliament shall meet in public, as
shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act.").
23. See id.art. 15 (3), at 54-55 ("Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of
access to docuncnts of the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever
their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance
with this paragraph. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private
interest governing this right of access to documents shall be determined by the
European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations, acting in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure."); see also Charter of Fundanental Rights of the
European Union art. 42. 2010 OJ.C 83/389, at 400 [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
24. See Proposed Public Access Regulation, supra note 18, 3 ("The legal base for
public access to d(ocuments isnow Article 15(3) of the consolidated version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This new provision extends the
public right of access to documents of all the Union institutions, bodies, ofices and
agencies. The Court of Justice, the European Central Bank and the European
Investment Bank are subject to this provision only when exercising their administrative
tasks.
25. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 15, art. 10(3), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 20 ("Every
Citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions
shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.").
26. See id. art. 11 (1)-(4), at 21 (stating:
1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly
exchange their views in all areas of Union action.
2. The insti[tuions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular
dialogue with representative associations and ciMil
society.
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European Union's legitimacy should be assessed in terms of its
outputs rather than inputs,27 the TFEU and TEU focus here on
inputs.2 1 What matters is that citizens know what the institutions
are doing and that they have an opportunity to participate in
policymaking.
These requirements of transparency are addressed by
allowing citizens to watch meetings by video, which is streamed
to the Internet and available for download. The Council29 and
the European Parliament" have established web pages where
their public activities can be watched contemporaneously or
after the event. The European Union provides access to a range
of other video and photographic material, and has its own
YouTube channel. There is even a kids' corner on the Europa

3. The European Commission shall carr out broad consultations with
parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are
coherent and transparent
and providing in subsection 4 for citizens' initiatives); see also Council Regulation No.
211/2011 iEC on the Citizens' Initiative, 2011 O.J I 65/ 1, at 3.
27. See, e.g., Anand Menon & Stephen Wcatherill, TransnatioalisigLegitimacy in a
Globalising World: How the European LUion Rescues Its States. 31 W. EUR. POL. 397, 402
(2008) ("The single market offers itself as the obvious source of output legitimation
that can be taken as a justification tir an apparent absence
legitimacy enjoyed by the key supranational decision-inakers ....

of orthodox input
"); see also Deirdre

Curtin & AlbertJacob Meier, Does Transpaercy Strengther Legiimacy?, I I INFO. POLITY
109, 112 (2006) ("On the whole the legitimacy of the EU and its decisions has tended
to be focussed [sic] on the output side of the equation ... rather than on the input
side."); (f Robert 0. Keohane et al., Democracy-Er h(tncing M"alu!t,ateralism, 63 INT'l ORG.
1, 14 (2009) ("When policies are adopted deliberately-after suiicient discussion,
debate, and the sitting of reasons and evidence, including fr om experts-they are more
likely to be policies that people are prepared to live wvith.").
28. See Olivier De SchuttCr, Europe in Search ofIts Civil Societ,. 8 EUR. _. 198, 199
(2002) ("[1i]here exists a rather vague but widely diffused impression that the
legitimacy of the European process of integration, which for forty years has been
mainly result-based, must now be more process-based. Output-legitimacy must be
complemented by input-legitimacy.").
29. COUNCIL EL R. UNION WEBCAST, http://video.consilium.europa.eu/?site
Language-en (last visited May 25, 2012). For agendas and other documents relating to
Council meetings, together with links to wcbcasts, see( OUNCIL EUR. UNION(ONSILIUM, http:/iwwv.consilium.eu ropa.euipress/council-meetings-lang-en&
cmsid- 1119 (last visited May 25, 2012).
30. For the European Parliament's main web page with videos, see ELR.
PARLIAMENT, http:/iwwv.europarl.europa.euiportil/en (last visited May 25, 2012).
31. For links to EU video and photographic material, see EUR. PARLIAMLNT
MOBILL,

hLtp://curopa.cu/miclia-cenu c/videos-plhoos/index-ein.hLll

May 25, 2012).

(last

visited
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website with a number of games.3 The Europa website thus
provides access to material that ranges from contemporaneous
coverage of legislative activities to educational games to public
relations materials.
Similarly, the EU institutions also publish a range of
different types of documents ranging from those that are
published in the Official Journal to background documents for
the legislative process to documents aimed at citizens." And, the
institutions link some of their publication activities to
transparency,
accountability,
and
evidence-based
policymaking. 34 The Commission publishes numerous Green
Papers, White Papers, Communications, and other prelegislative
consultative documents that provide information about
proposed policy initiatives and solicit comments on those
initiatives. Impact assessments of proposals likely to have
significant impacts are designed to ensure that policyimaking is
evidence-based' 35 and an Impact Assessment Board monitors the
Commission 'simpact assessments. 36s Improving the transparency
of impact assessments is one of the Board's concerns." An
32. KIDS (ORNER:

EU (AMLS

ANDAQUIZZES, http:,/europa.eu/kids-corner/index-

en.htm (last visited May 25, 2012).
33. See, e.g., EUR. COMMISSION, (UIDE

TO THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS' INITIATIVF

(2011), available at http://c.europa.eut/citizens-initiative/files/guide-eci-en.pdt.
34. See European Commission, Smart Regulation in the European Union:
(nmmunication frIom the (omLmission to the European Parliament, tihe Council, the
European Economic and Social (onumittce and the (onmittee of the Regions, COM
(2010) 543 Final (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Smart Regulation in the EU] ("Stakeholder
consultations and impact assessments are now essential parts of the policy making
process. They have increased uansparency and accountability, and promoted evidencebased policy making.").
35. See id. at 6 ("It is essential that the planning of impact assessment work is
transparent so that stakeholders can cngage in the process as early as possible. As of
2010, the Commission publishes roadmaps for all proposals that are likely to have
significant impacts, including delegated and implementing acts, explaining whether an
impact assessment is planned or not and why.").

36. See, e.g.,
European Commission, Impact Assessment Board Report for 2010:
Commission StaffWorking Paper, SEC (2011) 126 Final Jan. 2011).
37. See Impact Assessment Bd., European (Commn, Opinion, DG VIARKT-Iptpact
Assessment on the:
Prposal fir a Legislate Jitiatve on Short Selling and Credit Default
Swaps, 2010/MARKT/023 ("To facilitate rcading by non-experts the report would
benefit from simplify ing the presentation and analysis of some options ....To avoid

misunderstanding, the term 'administrative burdens' should be replaced by
compliance costs' or 'administrative costs' wherever appropriate in the text, headings
and tables ....Finally, a table providing an overview of the scope of the various

measures could be useflly annexed for transparency.").
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enormous amount of detailed information is available to citizens
who choose to look for it. 8 And much of the information is
translated into all of the European Union's official languages;
multilingualism is a key commitment of the European Union."
Even information the institutions would like to keep secret may
leak out.40

When the EU institutions make documents available, even
in multiple languages, availability does not guarantee that
citizens read them. The volume of published material on EU
policymaking is enormous,4 '

and citizens need to rely on

intermediaries to help them sort what matters to them from
what does not.s1 Some policy issues are more visible than
others." From the perspective of transparency as a mechanism
of accountability, variations in the visibility of policy issues would

38. See Curtin & Meijer, supra note 27, at 109 ("Less than a decade ago citizens
had no easy means of obtaining information about the EU, now European citizens can
obtain a great deal of information and download a huge variety of documents
irrespective of where they are based or the tiie of day.").
39. See, e.g.,
(OMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMNFUNITIFS, FINA REPORT: HIGH I EVE
(ROUP ON MUITIlINGUAlISM 5 (2007), available (t http://ec.europa.euilanguages,
documen s/doc1664-cn.pdf ("Multilingualisin has been part of [European]
Community policy, legislation and practices from the time of the Treaties of Rome.").

In some respects, the ctmmiuneint to multilingualisin is more theoretical than real. See,
e.g.,
Juliane House, English as a Lingua Franca: A Threat to iWultilingualisat , 7 J.
SOCIOI INGU ISTICS 556, 561 (2003) ("It is also an open secret that the EU's supposedly
huiane multilingualisin is but an illusion."). Citizens have the right to communicate
with the institutions in their own (official EU) language under Regulation No. 1.
although in practice there isevidence that they do not necessarily do so. See Charter of
Rights, supra note 23, art. 41 (4) 2010 0)J. C 83, at 399-400 ("Eve person may write to
the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the Treaties and must have an
answer in the same language."). See generally Gilberte ILenaerts, A Failure to Comply with
the EULanguagePolig: A Study of the CouncilArchives, 20 MUiTII 1NGUA 221 (2001).
40. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 484 ("Yet, the Commission is a multinational
and multicultural bureaucracy with close links to governments, lobbyists and a very
inquisitive press corps. Few of its internal secrets stay secret for rel) long.").

41. See Curtin & Meijer, supra note 27, at 116 (noting this "information overload"
and that -[e]ven experts have a hard time in dealing with the incredible amount of
information").
42. Cf Soon A (hun & Janice Warner, Tnding Information in an Era of Abundance:
Towards a Collaborative Tagging Environrment i Go ernment, 15 INFO. POIITY 89, 91
(2010) (proposing a "collaborative tagging )yten architecture" to help users discover
and share online documents).

43. See Jan Beyers, Policy Issues, O

1anisation,
Foriat and the Poitical .Strategies of

1nterest Organisations,31 W. EUR. POL. 1188, 1190 (2008) ("Issues can feature high on
the political agenda and gain much public attention or [ley can be of concern Lo a
handful of actors.").
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not really matter if they were attributable to the inherent
characteristics of those issues. But, the visibilit- of policy issues is
affected by many different factors; crises and scandals can
enhance the visibility of policy issues. Since the financial crisis,
some issues of financial regulation are more visible than
others.4 4 The choices the EU institutions, Member States, and
private sector groups make about framing policy issues affects
the visibility of the issues.4' The EU institutions characterize
some issues of financial regulation as being relevant to
4
consumer stakeholders."
However, consultations about issues
that relate to consumer protection do not necessarily identify
consumers as key stakeholders.i For example, in 2011 the
Commission consulted about interest rate restrictions in the
European Union.4" The consultation document invited

44. The question of whether and how bankers' remuncration should be regulated
is a visible issue in financial regulation, covered by the press, and addressed by
international organizations. See, e.g.,
Heather Stewart & Katic Allen, Even the Bankers
Are Saying It:This Might Be the End for Big Bonuses. OBSERVER (U.K) (Feb. 4 2012),

http:/iw,/,lv.guardian.co.ukibusinessi2012/feb/05/banikers-end-big-bonuses;
FIN. STABILITY BD., 2011 THEMATIC REVIEW ON COMPENSATION: PEER REVIEW REPORT
(2011), available at htLp:/ /wsw.financialstabili,

board.org/publications/r11101a.pdt

45. C] Anne Schneider & Mara Sidney, What is Next for Po" De gr a-,d Social
Construction Theon ?. 37 PO'Y STUD. J. 103, 106 (2009) ("The policy design approach
directs scholars to examine who constructs policy issues, and how they do ;o,such that

policy actors and the public accept particular understandings as -real," and how
consUuctions of groups, problems and knowledge then manifest themselves and
become institutionalized into policy designs, which subsequently reinforce and
disseminate these constructions.").
46. For example, in consulting on responsible lending and borrowing in the EU,
the Commission defined the target groups as tollows: "All citizens and organisations
were welcone to contribute to this consultation. Contributions were particularly sought
fr1om consumer organisations, the financial services industry and public authorities."
See Consultation
on Responsible Lending and Borowi-g in the EU EUR. (OMMISSION-EU
SINGLE
MA-RKET,
http:i/ec.europa. eu /internalmarket/consultationsi2009i
responsible-len(ing-en.htm (last visited Ma 25., 2012); see also EUROPEAN COMM'N,
PLBLIC (ONSLLTATION ON RESPONSIBLE LENDING AND BoRROWING IN THE EU (2009).
47. For an example of a consultation that did seek public input see, e.g.,
EL ROPEAN COMM'N, CONSUL TATION )OCUMENT: REVIEW OF I)IRECTV 94/19/EC ON
DEPOSIT-GUARANTLL SCHEMES (DGS) 2 (2009), available at http://ecc.uropa.Cu/

internal market/consultations/docsi2009/deposit guarantee schemesicoisultation_
dgs_2009_en.pdf ("This consultation intends to gather conuibutions t-om the public
for the review of the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes.").
48. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ON THE STUDY ON
INTEREST RAIE RLSTRICTIONS IN THE EU (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
intern alarket/ consultrations/ docs/ 2011 /ilneres Lrat Lcrsicions/ consultation
_en.pdf.
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comments from "stakeholders."" The summary of responses to
the consultation notes that some responses were received from
stakeholders
described
as
"consumer/user
representatives/advocates. "" Whereas stakeholders representing
the financial sector expressed concerns that "interest rate
restrictions have a detrimental impact on the consumer's ability
51
to access credit which can exacerbate financial exclusion,"'

consumer groups saw regulation of interest rates as "an
important tool for consumer protection.15 2 The consultation on
the Green Paper, Towards an Integrated EuropeanMarketfor Card,
Internet and Mobile Paynments,5 welcomes comments from
consumers, although the comments of market participants,
national goverments, and national competent authorities seem
to have been more desired. 4 It is not surprising that the
Commission emphasizes its interest in receiving input to
consultations from bodies that can claim to have expertise
relevant to the development of policy, as the Commission
regularly states that it is committed to evidence-based
policymaking. 55 But if policy in a particular field, such as
financial regulation, is developed in processes that tend to
involve market participants rather than consumers, the
Commission leaves itself open to criticisms that its processes and
49. See id. at 4 ("Stakeholders are invited to send their responses to the questions
raised in this document ... .").
50. EUROPEAN COMM'N, SUMIARY OF RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATItON
ON THE STUDY ON INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS IN THE EU 3 (2011), available at

http:,/c.teuropa.cu/interinal-market/finseiices-retail/docs/policy/irrsumminaiyen.pdf ("The category 'consumeir/uscr represcntatives/advocates' comprises

individual consumers (citizens), bodies that act for their members in their capacity as
consumers and certain consume r-ocused think tanks."). This group represented
fifteen percent of the total responses. Id. at 4.
5 1. Id at5.
52. Id.

53. European Commission, Towards an Integrated European Market for Card,
Internet and Mobile Payments: Green Paper, C()M (2011) 941 Final (jan. 2012)
[hereinafter Green Paper].
54. The Commission's consultation page on the Green Paper states: "A11 citizens
and organisations are welcome to contribute to this consultation. Contributions are
particularly sought from market participants, national governments and national
competent atnhoritis." See Consultation on Green Paper-Towardsan Integrated European
Marketfor Ca, Irt
and Mobile Paym
Rnts, UR. COMMISSION-EU SINGLE MARKET,
http:/euc.enropa.euinternalmar kt /consultations/ 2012/card-intLernt mobile
paymncits ci.huin (last visited May 25, 2012).
55. See, e.g , Smart Regulation in the EU, supra note 34, at 2.
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the policies they produce are flawed. The financial crisis
showed that failures of financial regulation can impose
significant costs on nonmarket participants. And a number of
commentators have suggested that policymakers' unwillingness
to challenge the prevailing orthodoxies contributed to the
failures of regulation. 5 Consumers' lack of participation in
policymaking with respect to financial regulation is problematic
from a broad, open-government perspective, which emphasizes
participation rather than expertise-based policymaking. It also is
problematic because narrow participation in policymaking
involves the risk of producing worse policies than broader
discussions might produce.
There are a number of ways in which consumers' interests
and views are incorporated into EU policymaking. As a
component of the European Union's formal rulemaking
procedures, the European Economic and Social Committee
("EESC") represents the interests and views of the social
partners in the European Union's legislative processes. 5 The
EESC's opinions on proposed EU legislation often focus on the

56. Cf Cris Shore, 'Eurpaw Go ,er,-e,
or Govermnertaty? The Eureop n
Commission and the Future of Demo, atic Govenunent. 17 EUR. IJ 287, 302 (201 1)
("Despite its rhetoric of wider participation and democratic inclusiveness, the
Commission's discourse on European governance promotes a technocratic model of
steering and managing that does subvert parliamentary democracy and advance a new
form of clitisi.").
57. See FINANCIAL SFRVS. AUTH., THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTIAND:
FINANCIAI
SERVICE'.S
AUTHORITY
BOARD
REPORT
9
(2011),
( vaiabte (t

http://wNw.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/otheIr/rbs.pdf ("Banks are different because excessive
risk-taking by banks (for instance through an aggressive acquisition) can result in bank
failure, taxpayer losses, and wider economic harm. Their failure is of public concern,
not just a concern for shareholders.").
58. See id. at 259 (referring to "the widespread intellectual delusion that the global
economy and financial system had become more stable as a result of financial
innovation"); see also id. at 260 ("[The] decisions were made in a Context which
included... [a] consensus among practitioners and policy-makers across the world,
which confidently assumed that the financial system had been made more stable as a
result of the very financial innovation and complexity which we now understand played
a significant role in the failure both ol the overall system and of RBS within it. In this
climate, very few people in positions of responsibility in major regulatol) authorities or
central banks appreciated the growing risks, and several argued authoritatively that the
risks to the linancial system and to the banking system in particular had reduced.").
59. See Stijn Srisnans, European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional
Interests, 9 EUR. L.J. 473, 481-84 (2003) (analyzing 1he European Economic and Social
Committee's role).
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interests of consumers. 0 Consumer groups participate in
consultations as stakeholders, either individually or together
with other consumer groups. For example, a number of
different groups that represent users of financial services
coordinate their activities in a European Federation of Financial
Services Users." The Bureau Europeen des Unions de
Consommateurs ("BEUC") is an umbrella group based in
Brussels for a number of consumer organizations. BEUC focuses
on a number of different consumer issues, including issues of
financial services policy. 2 The EU institutions have decided to
fund "an expertise centre to provide non-industry stakeholders
with technical expertise on financial services issues. ' 163 The
Commission has encouraged consumer input into the policy
process by establishing groups of expert users of financial
services, In 2010, the Commission decided "to set up a group
of financial services users and to define its tasks, composition
and structure in a formal legal act.' 5 This is one example of the
Commission's work to increase stakeholder participation in

60. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal
tor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Agreements
Relating to Residential Property,' 2011 O.J. C 318/133, 1.10 ("The [European
Economic and Social Committee] suggests that certain provisions be clarified or
enlarged upon in order to enhance consumer infiormation on variable rates.
Consumers have little awareness of relerence indices and of the impact variations in
rates can have on repayment amounts. It believes that usurious interest rates should be
banned, that lending rates tor the main residence should be capped, and that changes
in interest rates should be based only on objective, reliable and public indices that are
external to the lender.").
61. The European Federation of Financial Services Users was previously known as
Eurolnvestors (the European Federation of Investors or EFI). It was established in
2009, "tollowing the financial crisis which demonstrated the limits of the almost
exclusive dialogue between regulators and the financial industr), largely ignoring the
user side." See EUROINVESTORS, CESR TECHNICAL AVTWICE TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIFIL) RFVIEW-EQUITYMARKET S 1 (2010).
62. See BEUC, (REDIT A(,REEMENTS RELATNG TO RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY:
PROPOSAL FOR A )IRETIVE,BEUC POSITION 3-5 (2011).
63. EUROPEAN COMM'N, RESTORING THE HEALTH AN) STABILITY OF THE EU
F1NANCLL SECTOR 19 (2012), available at http://cc.curopa.eu/intcrinalmarkct/
smact/ docs/ 20120206_restoring health en.pdf
64. See, e.g.,
Caroline Bradley, Consuaters of Financial Services and M4ulti-Level
Regulation in the European U ion. 31 FoRD-AM1 INT'L LJ. 1212, 1229 (2008) (noting the
establishment of Fin-Use, the Forum of User Experts in the Area of Financial Services
in 2004).
65. Commission Decision No. 2010/1 199/02 (Setting up a Financial Services User
Group), 2010 O.J C 199/12, 9.
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policyrnakingtb The new group, Financial Senvices User Group
("FSUG"), was to be
[C] omposed of financial services experts such as individuals
appointed to represent the interests of consumers, retail
investors or micro-enterprises, but also individual experts
having particular expertise in users, needs and priorities in
the field of financial services, for example lawyers
representing
consumers,
employee
or
worker
representatives or academics. The group should represent
7
an adequate geographical coverage within the Union.6
The FSUG has commented on a number of EU and non-EU
initiatives," including the Commission s 2011 consultation on
interest rate restrictions." The FSUG is effective as a means of
feeding sophisticated consumer-focused analysis into the
European Union's policymaking process, which should promote
better or smart regulation objectives. It is not so clear that the
FSUG promotes the transparency of policymaking. Thus, it likely
does more to enhance output legitimacy than input legitimacy.
Moreover, the establishment of groups such as FSUG coupled
with the Commission's tendency to work with organized groups
raises some questions about who is, in effect, being excluded
from participation in policymaking.70

66. C]. L)e Schutter, supra note 28, at 206 (asking whether the Commission should
actively structure existing civil society networks and create new ones or take civil
society
as it is); Smismans, supa note 59, at 481 (noting that "the Commission does not always
resist the teiptation to use civil society as a legitimating discourse tor all itsexisting

interactions, including those with all sorts of private lobby actors").
67. Setting up a Financial Services User Group, 20 10 O.J. C 199, 10.
68. For an example of a comment on a non-EU initiative, see the Financial
Services User Group's (FSUG) response to the Financial Stability Board ("FSB") on
consurner linance protection. FIN. SERVS. USER GRP., FINANCIAL SERICES USER
GROUP'S (FSUG) RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (FSB) ON CONSUMER
FINANCE PROTECTION WITH PARTICULAR FOCLS ON CREDIT-REPORT TO THE G20

LEADERS 3 (2011), available at http:i/ec.europa.eu/internalma-ket/iinser-ices-retail/
docs/fsug/opinions/ftsbconsuinerfinance_protection-2011_09_27.pdf. It argues that
the FSB's "approach to and definition of consumner protection needs to be redefined."
See id.
69. See FIN. SLRVS. USER GRP., FINANCIAL SLR\I(CLS USER GROUP'S (IFSUG) OPINION
ON INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS IN THE EU (2011), available at http://ec.europa.cu/
internal imarket/iinsex ices-retail/docs/fiug/opinions/i-r-2011 03 22 en pdl

70. See, e.g, Sinismans, supra note 59, at 491 ("To what extent does the European
integration process become moire inclusive tirough a civil
dialogue which privileges
contacts with Brussels-based confederations of associationsv").
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Even where issues are defined and described as affecting
consumers directly, consultation documents and proposed rules
are sometimes not drafted clearly. 1 In 2001, the Commission
focused on openness as a characteristic of good governance,
stating:
The Institutions should work in a more open manner.
Together with the Member States, they should actively
communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it
takes. They should use language that is accessible and
understandable for the general public. This is of particular
importance 7in order to improve the confidence in complex
institutions. 1

In order to achieve greater openness, the Commission
sometimes publishes citizens' summaries of documents.
Citizens' summaries, however, tend to be documents that merely
highlight proposed measures in very general terms. The citizens'
summary of the proposed directive on credit agreements
relating to residential property describes the proposed directive
in just over a page, whereas the proposed directive is over fifty
pages long. Itis possible that citizens may be more willing to
read a short document, but it is not clear that such a short
summary really enhances the transparency of the proposal in
any meaningful sense. The Commission produces other
nontechnical publications to explain its activities. For example,
in early 2012, the Commission published a booklet with the title,
Restoring the Health and Stability of the EU Financial Sector.74 The
booklet describes the European Union's ongoing changes to
financial regulation for nonspecialists. The booklet and citizens'
summaries seem designed as public relations exercises rather

71. See e.g.,
Smart Regulation in the EU, supra note 34, at 8 ("Managing the
quality of the legislation also means making sure that it isas clear and accessible as
possible. The Commission scrutinizes all new legiative proposals to ensure that the
rights and obligations they create are set out in simple language to facilitate

implementation and enfrceiment." ).
72. Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: White
Paper from the Commission, ( OM (2001) 428 Final July 2001) [hereinafter European
Governance White Paper].
73. See e.g, CitizensS
New EU Law on Loars for Buying Homes, EUR.
(oMMissioEN-EU SINGL MARLLT, http://ec.europa.cu/inerinal-nmarkct/finseiicesretail/ docs/credit/in ortgage/ctizenss uhin aryen.pdf (last
visited May 25, 2012).
74. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 63.
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than as
mechanisms for involving citizens in
policy
75
development.
Although many citizens either do not choose to study
proposals for changes in regulation, or are otherwise unable to
navigate the complexities of those proposals, there are
individuals and organizations that do study developing policy in
a range of different areas. Not only do they read published
documents, but they also ask for nonpublished documents
under the European Union's access-to-documents rules. 7 ' These
requests are not inevitably initially successful. For example, the
Council has been reluctant to disclose documents relating to
proposed legislation, leading the Court of Justice to insist that
77
access to legislative documents is important for democracy.
Although the Council claimed that disclosing legal advice about
a legislative proposal could "lead to doubts as to the lawfulness
of the legislative act concerned, ' 78 the Court stated that:
It is precisely openness in this regard that contributes to
conferring greater legitimacy on the institutions in the eves
of European citizens and increasing their confidence in
them by allowing divergences between various points of view
to be openly debated. It is in fact rather a lack of
information and debate which is capable of giving rise to
doubts in the minds of citizens, not only as regards the
lawfulness of an isolated act, but also as regards the
7
legitimacy of the decision-making process as a whole. 9
75. C]. Stephan Grim melikhuiisen, Being Tnparert or "pirrng the Mesage? An
Experirnent into the Elf'cts of Vaming MJessae Content on Trust in Governent, 16 INFO.
POLITY 35, 36 (2011) (noting that the "pressuire to be transparent has also pushed spin
control towards the (enter stage of government"); Shore, sopra note 56, at 291 (noting
that the Commission's approach to governance combines ideas of increasing openness,
participation, and accountability with a public relations strategy).
76. See Council Regulation No. 1049/2001 Regarding public Access to European
Parliament. Council and Commission Documents, 2001 OJ. L 145/43; see also
Vcsterdorf. supra note 12, at 913-24 (discussing the development of the right of access
to information).
77. See, e.g., Sweden & Turco v. Council, Joined Cases C-39/05 P & C-52/05 P,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-4723. 1[46 (noting "where the Council is acting in itslegislative
capacity .. wider access must be granted to documents ....Openness in that respect
contributes to strengthening democracy by allowing Citizens to scrutinize all the
information which has tormed the basis of a legislative act. The possibility for Citizens
to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the
effcctive exercise of their democratic rights").
78. Id.1[59.
79.1.
2.
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The Court suggested that if a specific legal opinion were "of
a particularly sensitive nature" or had "a particularly wide scope
that goes beyond the context of the legislative process in
question," the Council could deny access to the legal opinion
provided that the Council gave detailed reasons for its refusal."'
The Court of Justice subsequently cited the language quoted
above in the context of a request for documents generated
during an assessment of the compatibility of a concentration
with the common market." The General Court of the European
Union has said that citizens should be able to follow the
institutions' decisionmaking processes in detail, including being
able to know which Member States made particular proposals.'
In these decisions, the courts demonstrate a commitment to a
high level of transparency. " But, enforcing compliance with the
80. Id. 69. C] Toland v. Parliament, Case T-471/08, [20111 E.C.R. II
, 80
(delivered June 7, 2011) (not yet reported) (considering Article 4(3) of Regulation
1049/2001, which provides an exception for disclosure of certain documents if
"disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's decisionmaking process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure" in the
Court'sJudgment and stating that "the fact that the use by the Members of Parliament
of the financial resources made available to them is a sensitive matter followed with
great interest by the media, which the applicant does not deny-quite the contrarycannot constitute in itself an objective reason sufficient to justify the concern that the
decision-making process would be seriously undermined, without calling into question
the very principle of ransparency intended by the [Treaty Establishing the European
Community]").
81. See Sweden v. Commission & MyTravel Group pie, Case C-506/08 P, [2011]
E.C.R. I
(delivered Mar. 3, 2011) (not yet reported).
82. See Access Info Eur. v. Council of the European Union, Case T-233/09, [2011]
E.C.R. II
1[ 69 (delivered on Mar. 22. 2011) (not yet reported) ("If citizens are to
be able to exercise their democratic rights, they must be in a position to follow in detail
the decision-making process within the institutions taking part in the legislative
procedures and to have access to all relevant intormation. The identification of the
Member State delegations which submit proposals at the stage of the initial discussions
does not appear liable to prevent those delegations from being able to take those
discussions into consideration so as to present new proposals if their initial proposals
no longer reflect their positions. By its nature, a proposal is designed to be discussed.
whether it be anonymous or not, not to remain unchanged following that discussion if
the identity of its author is known. Public opinion is perfectly capable of understanding
that the author of a proposal is likely to amend its content subsequently.").
83. Cf European Commission, On the Application in 20 10 of Regulation (EC) No.
1049/2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament. Council and Commission
Documents: Report friom the Commission, COM (2011) 492 Final, 1[ 8.2 (Aug. 2011)
("Ten years after the Regulation was adopted, its implementation has led to a
consolidated administrative practice with regard to the Citizen's right of access to
Commission documents. Through the case law, the Court of Justice and the General
Court have significantly contributed to this consolidation. Therefore, the Commission
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courts' requirements with respect to the access to documents
rules is slow and costly,"

The idea that EU bodies should conduct their work as
openly as possible involves disclosure about those who influence
the development of policy as much as it involves the publication
of policy proposals. Transparent consultations require
communication about the responses the consulting organization
receives, and transparent governance requires that policymakers
give reasons for their policy decisions. In a White Paper on
Governance in 2001, the Commission linked the need to
improve governance in the European Union with the objective
of encouraging European citizens to trust the EU institutions.
Increasing openness was an important aspect of improving
governance,.8 In addition to providing more information about
the development of policy, the Commission would develop
consultation standards 7 and guidelines on the collection and
remains convinced that the revision ol the Regulation should build on what has been
achieved in the past ten years.").
84. See e.g., Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing His Inquiry into
Complaint
297/2010/(ELB)GG
Against the
European
Commission,
Case
0297/2010/(ELB)GG (delivered Sept. 26. 2011), available at http://www.ombudsmnan.
europa.euien/cases/decision.faces/eni10879/html.bookmark (noting that a Brussels
lawyer sought access to the Commission Competition Directorate-Gencral's internal

manual of procedure in 2009, and that after the Oi budsman's intervention, lhe
Commission agreed to make a version of the manual publicly available in October 2011
or soon afterwards); Curtin & Mcijei supra note 27, at 113 ("The provisions on public
access to documents clearly have caused changes by giving citizens a tool to obtain the
documents they wvish to obtain, albeit with a considerable and significant time lag.").
85. See European Governance White Paper, supra note 72, at 3 ("Many people are
losing confidence in a poory understood and complex system to deliver the policies
that they wvant. The Union is olten seen as remote and at the same time too
inuusive."). Deirdre Curtin and Albert Jacob Meijer describe this period as involving a
shift fiom a legal understanding of transparency to a political one-transparency as a
"tool for a more democratic way of working." See Curtin & Meiier, supra note 27, at
113-14.
86. See European Governance White Paper, supra note 72, at 3 ("The White Paper
proposes opening up the policy-making process to get more people and organisations
involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. It promotes greater openness,
accountability and responsibility for all those involved. This should help people to see
how Member States, by acting together within the Union, are able to tackle their
concerns more effectively.").

87. Id. at 4; see Commission of the European C onnunities. Towards a Reinforced
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue-General Principles and Minimum Standards
for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission: Communication fiom the
Commission, COM (2002) 704 Final (Dec. 2002) [hercinafer Towards a Reinforced
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue].

20121

TRANSPARENC Y A-D FI-NCIAL REGULATION

1189

use of expert advice."s The White Paper identified five principles
of good governance: openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness, and coherence." Participation would include the
involvement of civil society,"' but ciil society groups would also
be subject to expectations of openness and transparency. 9' The
White Paper promised openness in order to increase citizens'
trust in the European Union and its institutions, and presented
participation as another core component of good governance,
but at the same time emphasized that participation was about
"more effective policy shaping."2
Since the White Paper, the Commission has been
developing a European Transparency Initiative, 3 which includes
increasing the transparency of interest representation (i.e.
lobbying)." Interest representatives would be encouraged to
register and provide information about themselves in return for
receiving notifications about developments in their areas of
interest. 95 In a follow-up to the Green Paper, the Commission
announced that it planned to treat submissions from
88. See European Governance White Paper, sap#(a note 72, at 5 (promising
publication of "guidelines on collection and use of exper ad vice, "so that it isclear
what advice isgiven, where it is coming tom, how it isused and what alternative views
are available").
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 14 ("Civil society includes the tollowing: trade unions and cmploycrs'
organisations
('social partners'); nongovernmental organisations; professional
associations; charitics; grass-roots organisations; organisations that involve citizens in
local and municipal life with a particular contribution ftori churches and religious
communities.").
91. Id. at 15 ("Civil society must itself follow the principles of good governance,
which include accountabili) and openness. The Commission intends to establish,
before the end of this Year, a comprehensive on-line database with details of civil
society organisations active at European level, which should act as a catalyst to improve
their internal organisation.").
92. d. ("[Consultanon helps the Commission and the other Institutions to
arbitrate between competing claims and priorities and assists
in developing a longer
term policy perspective. Participation is not about institutionalising protest. It isabout
more eflective policy shaping based on early consultation and past experience.").
93. See Commission of the European Cominunities, European Transparency
Initiative: Green Paper f om the Commission, COM (2006) 194 Final (May 2006).
94. Id.at 5 ("When lobby groups seek to contribute to EU policy development, it
must be clear to the general public which input they provide to the European
institutions. It must also be clear who they represent, what their mission is and how
they are lunded.").
95. Id. at 8 ("Groups and lobbyists which register certain infornation about
themselves would be given an opporunity to indicate their specific interests and, in
return, would be alerted to consultations in those specific areas.").
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unregistered
interest
representatives
as
"individual
'
:
contributions."" At this point in the follow-up document, the7
Commission cites its 2002 Communication on Consultation, 9
which suggests that input from representative European
organizations may weigh more heavily than input from others."
Article 11 of the TEU provides some support for a distinction
between citizens and interest representatives. Whereas the
institutions are to "give citizens and representative associations
the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their
views," the institutions are only required to "maintain an open,
transparent
and regular
dialogue with representative
associations and civil society. ' The Code of Conduct for
Interest Representatives requires them to "ensure that, to the
best of their knowledge, information which they provide is
unbiased, complete, up-to-date and not misleading. '" ° '
This brief description of the European Union's approaches
to achieving transparency suggests that the EU institutions are
implementing transparency policies to inform and involve
citizens and thereby increase their trust in the European

96. Commission of the European Communities, Follow-up to the Green Paper
'European Transparency lnitiativc: Communication
rom the Commission, COM
(2007) 127 Final, at 4 (Mar. 2007) ("The Commission therefiore intends to combine
the voluntary register with a new standard template for internet colsultation s. If
organisations submit their contributions in the context of such a consultation they will
be systematically invited to use the register to declare whom they represent, what their
mission is and how they are lunded.").
97. See id. See generall Towards a Reinfoirced Culture of Consultation and
Dialogue, supra note 87.
98. See Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue, supra note 87,
at 11-12 ("The Commission would like to underline the importance it attaches to input
from
representative
European
organisations.... However,
the
issue
of
representativeness at European level should not be used as the only criterion when
assessing the relevance or quality of comments.... [M]inoriit

views can also form an

essential dimension of open discourse on policies. On the other hand, it is important
for the Commission to consider how representative views are when taking a political
decision following a consultation process."); see also id. at 17 ("Openness and
accountability are rus important principles tor the conduct of organisations when they
are seeking to contribute to EU policy development. It must be apparent .. which
interests they represent ... [and] how inclusive that representation is.").
99. TEU post-Lisbon, ,,pa note 15, art. 11, 2010 OJ. C 83, at 21.
100. Commission of the European Communities, European Transparency
Initiative: A Framework foir Relations with Interest Represcntatives (Register and Code
of Conduct); (ommunication from the Commission, (OM (2008) 323 Final, at 7 (May
2008).
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Union,'0' to improve the performance of the institutions by
opening them up to public scrutiny, and to improve the quality
of EU policymaking. But whether transparency alone can
1
achieve these goals is doubtful. 12
The European Union faces special challenges in achieving
transparency with respect to policymaking because it is a
multilingual union"" that relies on translation. As the European
Union has expanded, EU institutions have tried to control the
increasing costs of translaion in ways which limit
transparency.' 4 Not all of the European Union's texts are
translated into all of the official languages.' 5 Policy documents
that are translated into all of the official languages tend to be
shorter than they used to be."" Other working documents are
translated into a smaller number of languages. In the context of
financial regulation, the European Union's financial authorities,
the European Banking Authority ("EBA"), 7 the European

101. For a discussion of diflerent views of the relationship between transparency
and uust, and contrasting the views of "transparency optimists" and "uansparency
pessimists," see Grimmelikhuijsen, supra note 75, at 36-37.
102. For a powerful critique of the naive assumptions or "myths" of transparency

in the European Union, see Curtin & Meije, supra note 27. at 120.
103. See, e.g., Commission of the European C(ommunities, A New Framework

Strategy fbr Multilingualism: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, thre European Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions, COM (2005) 596 Final, at 12 (Nov. 2005) ("It is... a
prerequisite for the Union's democratic legitimacy and transparency that citizens
should be able to communicate with its Institutions and read EU law in their own
national language, and take part in the European project without encountering any
language barriers.").
104. See, e.g., DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR TRANSI ATION, EUROPEAN COIM'N, STUDIES
ON TRANSLATION AND
ENVIRONMENT (2010).

MULTILINGUALISM: LAWNIAKING

IN THE EU MULTILINGUAL

105. See id. at 153 ("Now everything points towards English: usually this is the
source language of legislation and the dominant language for the institutional and
external communication of the EU (as is apparent irom most EU-produced websites),
although French has not lost its tormer privileged role yet.").
106. See EUROPEAN COMMN, TRANSLATION AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: A

HISTORY 40 (2010) ("[T]he Commission adopted several strategic documents,
particularly a decision on translation demand management, designed to strike the right
balance between the maintenance of multilingualism and thre deployment of optimum
woring methods .... [A] limit of twenty pages was introduced for documents to be
submitted foi adoption or approval.").
107. See Council Regulation No. 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supel-visol)
Authority (European Banking Akuthority), 2010 O(.J I 331 /12.
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Securities and Markets Authority ("ESMA"),'0 8 and the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
("ElOPA"), 1 ° consult on the development of detailed rules to
implement EU measures. Their consultations are carried out in
English. This reflects the fact that English tends to be the
language of the international financial markets,"0 but it also
illustrates a limit to transparency through multilingualism in
one area of EU policy. It is not clear whether a failure of
translation in consultations by these EU financial services
authorities is consistent with the European Union's transparency
requirements. The European Ombudsman recently stated, in
response to a complaint that a consultation paper on financial
sector taxation was published only in English, that a failure to
translate documents excluded non-English speaking citizens
from the democratic exercise of consultation,"' and constituted
maladministration. 112 Although the consultation involved
technical issues it also was relevant to consumers of financial
services."' The Ombudsman said that the Commission should
develop "clear, objective and reasonable guidelines concerning
the use of the treaty languages in its public consultations.""1 4 On
108. See Council Regulation No. 1095/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 O.
L 331/84
[hereinafter European Securities and Markets Authority Regulation].
109. See Council Regulation No. 1094/2010 establishing a European Superviso,
Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Amuhorit)
2010 0.
L
331 /48.
110. See. g, DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR TRANSLATION, supra note 104, at 91 ("Eflects
of internationalisation and thus the spreading of English tLerminology or the impact on
the national translations of tie later can be studied in tie area of capital markets and
finance terminology, which are strongly aflected by internationalisation.").
111. See Draft Recommendation of the European Ombudsman Concerning His
ln(luii) into Complaint 640/2011/AN Against the European Commission, Case:
0640/2011 /AN,
32 (delivered Nov. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Dralft Recommendation of
the European Ombudsman], available at htp://www.ombudsman.europa.cu/cases/
draftre coimendation.faces/en /11043/html. bookmai rk.
112. See id. 43 ("In the Ombudsman's view, the above scope illustrates that the
Commission: (i) unjustifiably; and (ii) disproportionately restricted the right of nonEnglish speaking Citizens to be consulted, by not making the Consultation Paper
available to them in languages other than English. This is an instance of
maladministration.").
113. See id. 1 30 ("[A]s tre complainant pointed out, despite its 'technical'
character, the topic was of direct interest to large sectors of society, since potential
taxes on financial Uansacions will most likely be passed on to consumers by financial
cnitiics, in tire forim of banking Costs or oer charges.").
114. Id. at Conclusions No. 2.
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the other hand, translation itself raises issues of transparency.
All official language versions of legal texts are equally
authentic,11 5 but errors of translation mean that it is not always
1
clear what the rules are.' 6
In many ways the complexity of the European Union
interferes with the achievement of transparency. The
supranational aspects of the European Union are more distant
from citizens than their domestic governments. The increasing
institutional complexity of the European Union means that
sources of information about the European Union's policies
have increased in number, adding to problems of information
overload. And multilingualism complicates transparency. The
following Sections of this Essay illustrate that in the field of
financial regulation issues of urgency and complexity create
their own additional problems of opacity.
I. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES AND TRANSPARENCY
The global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis
shook confidence in financial institutions in the European
Union1 1 7 (and outside) and in the value of debt issued by a

115. See DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR TRANSIATION, sup

a note

104, at 37 ("Producing

high quality translations is all the more important within a system where translated
texts will become equally authentic as the original one.").
116. See Theodor Schilling, Bund
'-ltiling:alism.
On Dif#,rent Approaches to the
Handling of Divergig Language Vrsios of a Cornrnunity Law, 16 EUR. L. 47, 48 (2010)
(asking "whether the mnultilingualism as practiced... by the EU iscompatible wilh the
rule of law requirements of accessibility of a law and ioreseeability of itseifects as
developed by the Court of Human Rights under the (European) Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms"); EUROPLAN COMMN,
STU-DIES ON TRANSIATION ANT) MUT I.1NGUAl ISM: OUANTIFYING QULAL ITY COSTS ANT)
THL COST OF POOR QU Al1ITYINTRANSLATION 1 (2012) ("[P]oor translations-and poor
originals for that inaIer-can lead to damages suffered by citizens or companies, and
to legal uncertainty and court cases.").

117. See, e.g.,
Commission Communication to Member States on the Application of
State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context
of the Current Global Financial Crisis, 2008 0.j C 270/8, at 8 [hereinafter Application
of State Aid Rules] ("Given the scale of the crisis,
now also endangering fundailentally
sound banks, the high degree of integration and interdependence of European
financial markets, and the drastic repercussions of the potential failure of a systemically

relevant financial institution fuirther exacerbating the crisis, the Commission recognises
tLha Member States may consider it necessard

saleguard the stability of the financial systei.").

to adopt appropriate measures to
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number of the Member States."" in both cases, the EU
institutions and the Member States were tempted to act quickly
to restore confidence.1 The crises were not merely European
crises but required the European Union and its Member States
to cooperate with other jurisdictions and international financial
institutions.' 20 And, in both cases, the Member States faced
political pressure to focus on domestic aspects of the crisis at the
same time as needing to focus on cooperation with each
other.2 1 Member States were pulled to act at the international
level because the problem of increasing stability of the
international financial markets was an international, rather than
merely an EU,problem. And they were pulled toact domestically
first to protect their financial institutions and then to wrestle
with the problems of implementing austerity measure.'
118. See Nicholas )orn, RegulatoD " Sloth and Activism in the Efjetvescence oJ'Finacial
Crisis, 33 LAW & POL'Y 428 428 (2011) ("in 2010, it became clear that sovereign states,
which had 'bailed out' the banking sector, were themselves becoming targets of a
mixtulre of speculation and genuine fears and uncertaintics over their financial
health.").
119. See e.g., HO-U SE OF COIMONS TREASU'
RY COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTLL'S
OPINION ON PROPOSAIS FOR Et ROPEAN FINANCIAI SUPERVISION, 2008-9, H.C. 1088, at

3 (U.K) ("While the intention of the new regulations is widely welcomed, there is a
great deal of unease about the detail. There isstill more unease about the speed with
which it is hoped to agree them: the Presidency is pressing for their adoption by
ECOFIN at the Council on 2 December. We consider that is far too fast: the proposals
will set in place a framework which should last for many decades, and there should be
proper time for consideration.").
120. See FN. STABILITY FORUM. REPORT OF THE FiNANCIAL STABILITY FORUNI ON
ENHANCING MARKET ANT) INSTITUTIONAI RESILIENCE 2 (2008) ("While national
authorities may continue to consider short-term policy responses should conditions
warrant it. to restore confidence in the soundness of markets and institutions, it is

essential that we take steps now to enhance the resilience of the global system.").
121. The United Kingdom began to consult on amending UK rules on depositor

protection in October 2007 in order to encourage confidence in the safty of deposits
in UK banks. See, e.g.,HM TREASURY ET A[., BANKING REFORM-PROTLCTING
DEPOSITORS: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2007); BANK OF ENGI AND ET Al., FINANCIAL
STABILITY AND DEPOSITOR PROTECTION: STRENGTHENING THE FRAMLWORK. 2008, Cm.

7308 (U.K.). The Commission published a proposal to revise EU deposit guarantce
rules in late 2008. See Commission of the European Communities. Amnending Directive
94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes as Regards the Coverage Level and the

Payout Delay: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council,
(1OM (2008) 661 Final (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Proposal Amending Directive
94/19/E(].
122. See e.g-,
INT'I MONETARY F ND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 11 /351, GREECE:
FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE STAND-BY ARRAN(EMENT, RLPHASING AND RE'QUEST FOR
WAIVERS OF NONOBSERVANCE OF PLRFORNLANCL (RITERIA: PRESS RELEASE ON THE
EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
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Vhereas domestic action may be even more transparent (or at
least more visible) than action at the EU level, 2 action at the
international level typically involves less transparency and less
effective consultation than action at the EU level.1 24
At the international level, the G20 countries agreed to
implement changes to financial regulation to enhance financial

stability. 12 5 They began by making public commitments to
strengthen international cooperation with respect to financial
stability and prudential regulation. They also agreed to work
together in other areas, including the supervision of hedge
funds and credit rating agencies. More than merely agreeing to
increased cooperation, however, the G20 committed to
"implement international financial standards (including the 12
key International Standards and Codes) ."12' The G20 countries
GREECE 4 (2011)

(" EU Summis in July and October took decisions on a path forward.
Meanwhile, the Greek authoritics had difficulties implementing the adjustment
program over the summer, falling behind across a range of policies. Social resistance to
the program continued to intensity as the economy weakened and opposition attacks
on the program accelerated.").
123. Even governments that are committed to transparency may at times ignore
normal procedures. See, e.g., SEIECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FAST-TRACK
LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND SAFEGU ARiS, 2008-9, H.L. 116-1, at
7 (U.K.) (noting that "fast-track legislation has dealt with such serious issues
as... [t]hc response to the economic collapse"): see also id. at 8 ("To what extent are
the transparency of the policy-making process within government and the
parliamentary legislative process compromised when bills are last-tracked?").
124. See Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational StandardSetting, 20 MINN.J. INTL L. 480. 486-87 (2011) ("Transnational standard-settCers engage
in consultation as a concession rather than as a matter of obligation: they are not
required by any binding rules to carr out consultations at all or in any particular way.
As a corollary of this lack of obligation, stakeholders do not have meaningful rights to
be consulted."). In February 2012, the Commission responded to claims that it had not
been sufficiently transparient about negotiations tor an anti-countertiting trade
agreeiclnt, explaining the steps it had taken to inform the Parliament, civil society, and
stakeholders about the negotiations. See E ROPEAN COMM'N, MEMO/12i99,
TRANSPARENCY OF

ACTA

NEGOTIATIONS (ANTI-C OUNTERFEITING TRA DE AGREEMENT)

(2012).
125. The (20, rather than the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), took the
lead in responding to the crisis. Cf. MICHEI CAMrESSUS ET Al., REFORM OF THE
INTLRNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTLM: A COOPLRATIVL APPROACH FOR THL TWLNTY FIRST

CENTURY 5 (2011), awalable at http:/iglobal-currencies'org/smi/gb/telecharinewsi

RapportCt
(amdessus-intgr
al.pdf ("[A]s long as problems in the international
monetary system are not addressed, an increasingly integrated world economy becomes
more and more ulnerable. A muddling through approach therefore is an increasingly
inadequate response.").
126. GROUP OF TWLNTY (620), DLCLAION ON STRENGTHENING THL FINANCLL
SYSTEM (2009).
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began to develop a more focused approach to ensuring that they
would implement the agreed standards than had existed
previously. The IMF and World Bank had developed a Financial
Sector Assessment Program ("FSAP") with reports on standards
and codes that assessed the extent to which IMF members were
in compliance with agreed international standards and codes.' 27
In early 2009, the G20 decided to rename the Financial Stability
Forum ("FSF"), which had been established ten years earlier to
address issues of financial stability, and thus the FSF became the
Financial Stability Board ("FSB").128 The FSB established a
system of peer review to encourage the G20 countries to keep to
their commitments to reform financial regulation. 29 The peer
review system supplements the FSAP and is designed to be more
coercive than the FSAP,- 0 but like the FSAP it is a mechanism to
encourage states to implement transnational standards of
127. See Kern Alexander, Global Finarcial Stardard Setting the GIO Committees, and
INT'l L. 861, 875 (2009) ("The IMF and World
Bank have also required many countries to demonstrate adherence or a realistic effort
to implement the Basel Accord in order to qualify for financial assistance as part of IMF
Financial Sector Assessment Programs and World Bank Financial Sector Adijustnent
Programs."); Diuncan E. Alford. Core Principles for Lffective Banking Supenision: An
Enjceable InUternationalFirancialS, rdard1, 28 B.C. INT'l & COMP. L REV. 237, 273-77
(2005) (describing Financial Sector Assessment Program reviews of France and the
United Kingdom).

InternationalEconomic Law, 34 BROOK.J.

128.

See

CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SL PERVISION

543 (2011); Enrique R. Carrasco, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability
Forum: The Awakening and Transformation of an InternationalBody. 19 TRANSNATL L. &
(ONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (2010); Overview ojRecent Interational Banking and Firancial
Viarket Developments. BANK INT'l SETTLEMENTS Q. RFV.,June 1999, at 1, 4 ("The global
financial turmoil of last year prompted a number of initiatives. In February, the Group
of Seven industrial countries established the Financial Stability Forum to improve
coordination and intormation exchange among the national authorities, international
institutions and international regulatory or expert groupings with responsibilities tor
questions of international financial stbilit.").
129. See FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVFW ON DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS:
PLLR RLVILW RLPORT, at i (2012) (noting that "the [Financial Stability Board] agreed
to include the Core Principles [for Eflective Deposit Insurance Systems] in the list of key
standards tor sound financial systems that deserve priority implementation depending
on country circtumstances"); see also BASLL (OMM. ON BANKING SUPLRVISION (B(CBS) &
INT'I ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, CORE PRINCIPI ES FOR EFFECTIVE DEPOSIT INSURANCE

SYSTEMS (2011).
130. Cf.Chris Brummier, How Internationai
fiaciai Law Works (and How It Doesn 't),
99 (;EO. I.J. 257, 262-63 (2011) ("[I]
nternational financial regulation, although
formally a species of 'soft law,' is a unique species of cross-border cooperation bolstered
by a variety of disciplinig mechanisms that, under certain circumstances, render it

more coercive than traditional theories of international law predict.").

20121

TRAN-SPARENCY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION

1197

financial regulation that are adopted without the level of

disclosure and consultation characteristic of EU policymaking
processes. The IMF is considering building financial stability
analysis into surveillance.'
The European Union tried to control the Member States in
their resort to domestic solutions to the financial crisis. For
example, the Commission had to adapt the EU state aid rules to
allow the Member States to rescue failing, and even
fundamentally sound, financial institutions promptly while not
undermining the state aid rules. 3 2 Although the Commission
adopted its guidelines to allow the Member States to act to
rescue financial institutions quickly, the need for rescues of
financial institutions persisted through the end of

2 0 1 1 .1"

EU

Member States were tempted to introduce their own new rules
relating to financial regulation without coordinating with each
other. 13 For example, the United Kingdom has been concerned
about protecting its own financial institutions from competition
131. See INT'L MONLTARY
STRENGTHENING SURVFIIANcE:

FUND, MANAGIN(,
DIRECTOR'S
2011 TRIENNIAI SURVEILL ANCE

STATLMLNT ON
REVIEW (2011),

available at http: //www.imiorg/ extrinal/np/pp/eng/201 1/10271 1.pdf. Under Article
4 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, IMF member countries need only use best efforits
to implement financial sector policies. See INT'l MONETARY Ft ND, 2011 TRIENNIAL
SURVEIIIANCE REVTEX-REVEW OF THE 2007 SL R1TII
BROADLR
LLGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SURVEILLANCE

ANCE

DECISION AND

THF

4
(2011),
available at
http:/iwwv.imf orgiexternalinpippiengi2011 /0826l1 .pdlf
132. See Application of State Aid Rules, supra note 117. at 8. The Commission
acknowledged that it would be necessary to act quickly to protect te financial markets.
Id. at 9 ("In applying these criteria to measures taken by Member States, the
Commission will proceed with thre swiftness that is necessary to ensure legal certainty
and to restore confidence in financial markets."); see also Michael Reynolds ct al., EU
Competition Policy in the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Weasures, 33 FORDHAM\ INT' LJ.
1670, 1689 (2010) ("The Commission has attempted to find a middle way between
states clamoring fir the power to rescue their most important financial instituions and
legal purists decrying an apparent chasm between the existing state aid rules and the
practice of the Commflission.").

133. See Commission Communication to Member States on the Application of
State Aid Rules to Support Measures in Favor of Banks in the Context of the Financial
Crisis. 2011 O.J. C 356/7, at 7 ("The exacerbation of tensions in sovereign debt
markets that has taken place in 2011 has put thre banking sector in the Union under
increasing pressure, particularly in terms of access to term funding markets. The
'banking package' agreed by the Heads of State or Government at their mecting of 26
October 2011 aims to restore confidence in thre banking sector.... Despite those
measures, the Commission considers that the requirements for State aid to be
approved pursuant to Article 107(3) (b) will continue to be fulfilled beyond the end of
2011.").
134. See, e.g, supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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from financial institutions based outside the European Union
that are subject to lower levels of regulation than those that
apply or are proposed in the European Union. 5 The European
Union's sovereign debt crisis has increased the tensions between
stronger and weaker economies inside and outside the
Eurozone.
The Commission proposed significant changes to the
structure of the European Union's financial regulatory system to
address the financial crisis,1 a and argued that the new measures
should be adopted quickly. 3 7 The European Union's
management of financial regulation would shift from a system of
advisory committees for the securities, banking and insurance
sectors to a system of European authorities for the different
sectors.
The proposed reforms of the structure envisaged
more EU-level, directly applicable rules to avoid the
implementation problems that result from harmonization by
means of directives. 139 The new structures involve a more intense
level of harmonization of financial regulation than existed

135. See, e.g.,
HIM TREASURY LT AL., supra note 121, at 3 ("Supporting and
promoting London, and the UK, as a centre for financial and business services remains
a priority for tire Government."); HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH To FINANCIAI
RLGLLATION: SLCURING STABILITY, PROTLCTING (ONSMLRS,

2012, (in.

8268, at 45

(U.K.) ("The Government will continue to work to ensure that there isadequate
flexibility in European legislation.").
136. See Commission of tire European Conlinunities, European Financial
Supervision: Communication from the Commission, COM (2009) 252 Final, at 3 (May
2009) [hereinafter European Financial Supervision] (proposing the establishment of a
European Systemic Risk Council and a European System of Financial Supervisors
(ESFS) consisting ol a robust netw'ork ol national financial supervisors working in
tandem with new European Supervisory Authorities to safeguard financial soundness at
the level of individual financial firns and protect consuuers of financial services").
137. Id. ("Given the urgent need for parallel action on supervision, the
Commission proposed an accelerated timetable for delivering on the reform of EU
financial supervision."); U. HOUSE OF COMMO.NS TREAULRY (OMMITTLL,sup a note 119.
at 3.
138. See European Financial Supervision, supra note 136, at 8 ("[T]he EU cannot
remain in a situation where there isno mechanism to ensure that national supervisors
arrive at the best possible supervisory decisions for cross-border institutions; where
there is insufficient cooperation and inforination exchange between national
supervisory authorities; where joint action by national authorities requires a tour de
force to take account of the patchwork of regulatory and supervisory requirements;
where national solutions are most often the only feasible option in responding to
European problems,where diftferent interpretations of the samne legal text abound.").

139. Id.at 3-4.
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before the financial crisis. 40 Perhaps in order to encourage the
Member States to accept this new level of harmonization, the
Commission characterized reformed EU financial regulation as
an enterprise that was not merely responding to developments
at the international level but that could influence international
standards. 4 ' The new authorities, the EBA, ESMA, and EIOPA,
have been operating since the beginning of 2011.12
More uniform harmonization of the rules of financial
regulation should enhance transparency. But a proliferation of
new rules and proposed rules tends to counteract this trend: in
addition to proposing changes to the structure of financial
regulation in the European Union the Commission proposed
many changes to the substance of financial regulation. 4 In
proposing these new rules the Commission sometimes acted
without respecting its normal consultation procedures. 4 4 New
rules were adopted to regulate credit rating agencies ("CRAs")
in 2009,115 but the following summer the Commission was
proposing amendments to the regulation to charge ESMA with
registration and supervision of CRAs. 1 41 In 2010, the

140. The Investment Managers Association told the House of Commons Treasury
(ommittee that it was in favor of increased harmnonization. See Ho SE OF COMMONS
TRLASLRY (y IOMMITTLE, supra note 119, at 13 ("The Investment Managers' Association
welcomed the prospect of a harmonised, and possibly less intrusive, rulebook... In too
many areas of financial markets regulation, and especially supeivision, national
difierences remain strong beneath a veneer of European harmnonisation.").
141. See European Financial Supevision, sopra note 136, at 4 ("With this initiative,
the EU is not just responding to its calls in the G20 framework tor interinational action
to build a stronger, more globally consistent, regulatol) and supexvisor system for the
future financial sector, but also setting out a modern and comprehensive regional
fiamework, whose principles should be taken up at international level.").
142. See Michel Barnier, The Date of lstJanua' 2011 VMarks a T,,, ing Pointfor the
European Fi ancial Sector, EUR. COMMISSION-MICHEL BARNIER, MEMBER OF THE EUR.
(OMMISSIoN
(Jan. 1, 2011), http:/iec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/
headlines/speeches/2011/01/20110101_cn.htmi.
143. See generall EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 63.
144. See, e.g., Proposal Amending Directive 94/19/E(, supra note 121, at 2 ("Due
to the urgency of the natter neither an impact assessncnt nor a public consultation
could be carried out for the current proposal.").
145. See Council Regulation No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, 2009 04. L
302/1: Corrigendun to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies, 2009 O.J. I. 350/59.
146. See European Comnnission, Regulation of the European Parlianicnt and of
the Council on Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies:
Proposal, COM (2010) 289 Final (June 2010); see also Council Regulation No. 513/2011
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Commission consulted on other issues with respect to CRAs,
including how to address over-reliance on ratings, perceived
problems of sovereign credit ratings, the need to increase
competition in ratings, and civil liability for ratings. 4 7 In late
2011, the Commission published a new proposed regulation and
a new proposed directive on credit ratings. 4 Over a relatively
short period the legal environment in which CRAs operated
changed significantly,14 9 and the European Union's rules have
not yet achieved equilibrium.
During a crisis, policymakers may feel they need to suspend
normal procedures of consultation and transparency, and the
Commission seems to have surrendered to urgency at times in
its responses to crisis, for example, in failing to translate
consultation documents in the interests of speed.15" But a
commitment to transparency and consultation that withers in
the face of serious crisis seems to be a weak commitment.
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, 2011 O.J. I.
145/30.
147. See get erall EUROPEAN COIM'N, PUBIIC CONSULXATION ON CREDTI RATING
AGENCIES (2010), av, ila'ble at http:i/ec.europa.euiinternalmarket/consultationsi
docs/2010/cra/cpapcr-cn.pdf.
148. See European Commission, Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on
Credit Rating Agencies: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council, COM (2011) 747 Final (Nov. 2011); European Commission. Amending
Directive 2009/65/EC on the Coordination of ILaws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions Rclating to Undertakings of Collective Invesunent in Transferable Securities
(UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EUJ on Aiternative Investment Funds Managers in
Respect of the Excessive Reliance on Credit Ratings: Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council, COM (2011) 746 Final (Nov. 2011).
Standard & Poor's stated that some of the proposed EU rules were "out of step with
ratings regulation elsewhere in the wvorld." Press Release, Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services, The Role and Regulation of Ratings Agencics in Europe (Feb. 7. 2012),
available at http://www.standardandpoors.comi/about-sp/ corporate-announcments/
en/us.

149. The European Union has not been alone in experiencing an evolution of
thinking how to regulate credit rating agencies.
150. See, e.g, )raft Recommendation of the European Ombudsman, supra note
111
39 ("To e extent that the Commission invokes reasons of urgency in order to
support its position, the Ombudsman takes the view that such considerations cannot
suffice to entitle the Commission completely to disregard the objectives of participation
and transparency enshrined in TEU Article 10(3), read in conjunction wiLh TEU
Al ticle 11 (3), unless the difficulties it would have faced by giving full effect to hose
provisions wvere insurmountable. In the Ombudsman's view, it was not established that
this was the case. In any event. even if this had been so. the Conmission's reason for
not translating anything into any language at any stage of the Consultaiol process is
clearly disproportionate.").
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Moreover, responses to crises arguably require more buy-in from
151
citizens rather than less.
III. FI\4ANCIAL REGULA TION: TRANSPARENCYI AND
COMIPLEXITY
Financial regulation is particularly problematic from the
perspective of transparency because of the complexity of the
financial markets, of the firms that participate in those markets,
and of the transactions in which they engage. Regulation of the
financial markets is as intricate as the markets themselves, and
the language of financial regulation is not easily accessible to
nonexperts. Rules and standards of financial regulation are
developed in multiple different fora (public and private) in
different jurisdictions. When the European Union addresses
issues of financial regulation it does so in a context where
transnational networks of standard-setters interact with
stakeholders based in multiple jurisdictions. 152 The European
Union's mechanisms of transparency cannot achieve complete
transparency with respect to financial regulation because of the
multiple complexities in financial regulation and because
increasing disclosures about the development of policy in the
field of financial regulation tends to increase rather than reduce
complexity.
In thinking about maximizing the transparency of financial
regulation perhaps we should be considering whether the rules
really need to be as complex as they are. For example, Andrew
Haldane of the Bank of England has suggested that simple rules
might be appropriate for complex activities .15" Financial firms
151. See, e.g., B. Guy Peters et al., Global fI-ancia Crisis. PubliL Adrirst,-tion and
Governance: Do New Probleens Require Ne u)
tions , 11 PUB. ORG. RDV. 13, 18 (2011)
(" M] anaging a crisis also requires gaining consensus or at least acquiescence across
the society and decent ralization Inay be a useful strategy for producing that legitimacy
for the proposed changes. If governments have to undertake a range of novel and
perhaps extreme policy initiatives then they may be well advised to invohe stakeholders
and thc general public to the greatest extent possible.").
152. Cf. HouSE Or (OMMONS TREASURY (ONIITTLL supa note 119, at 9 ("The
European Union isnot the only fiorunL for cross-border financial policy making. The
financial crisis
has prompted a plethora of activity as policy makers recognise the
importance of international cooperation to ensure financial stability in an environment
where thc degree of global financial integration has risen sharply.").
153. See Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Remarks on
Capital Discipline 3 (Jan. 9, 2011), (,,lable
at http://wNw.bankofengland.co.uk/

1202 FORDHAM LNTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1171
tend to want to have rules spelled out in detail, 154 but simpler
rules would have the advantage
of being more consistent With
1 5
ideas of better lawmaking.
EU financial regulation has become more complex over
time in multiple ways. The addition of a focus on systemic
financial stability to the objectives of financial regulation has
increased the complexity of the subject matter of EU financial
regulation. The European Union has proposed and adopted
new and more complex measures to deal with weaknesses in
financial regulation suggested by the financial crisis.
Structurally, the system of financial regulation in the European
Union has seen an expansion in the number and powers of
responsible authorities at the EU level. The sovereign debt crisis
has revealed a complex interaction between bank regulation
1
and confidence in sovereign debt. 56
The regulation of CRAs provides an example of complexity
in EU financial regulation. In September 2011, ESMA, which by
that point was responsible for supervising CRAs, published four
consultation documents on technical standards for the

publications/specches/2011 /speech484.pdf ("As a thought experiment, imagine
instead we wvere designing a regulatory fr-amework orom scratch. Finance isa classic
complex, adaptive system. What properties would a complex, adaptive system such as
finance ideally exhibit to best insure about futture crises- Simplicity is one. There is a
key lesson, here, from the literature on complex systems. Faced with complexity, the
temptation isto seek complex control devices. In lact, complex systems typically call for
simple control rules. To do otherwise simply compounds system complexity with
control complexity.").
154. Cf. Letter orom Brian R. Leach, Chief Risk Officer, Citigroup Inc., to Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al. 2 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comlcnts/s7-41-11/s74111-356.pdf
("[T]hc proposed rule is
complex, with overlapping and imprecise compliance requirements, and does not
provide sufficient clarity as to whaL type and level of activity is permissible. which itself
may impair capital markets.").
155. See DIRCTORATE-GEN. FOR TRANSLATION, .supra note 104, at 38 ("Since the
Edinburgh European Council of 1992, th need for better lawmaking-that is. acts with
a clearer, and simpler text complying with the principles of good legislation -has been
recognised at the highest political level.").
156. See e.g.,
Lagarde, supra note 5 ("We must also break the vicious cycle of banks
hurting sovereigns and sovereigns hurting banks. This works both ways. Making banks
suonger, including by restoring adequate capital levels, stops banks irom hurting
sovereigns through higher debt or contingent liabilities. A id restoring confidence in
sovereign debt helps banks, which are important holders of such debt and typically
benefit flom explicit or implicit guarantees from sovereigns.").
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regulation of CRAs. 15' The documents were published in
English, comprised over 150 pages, and asked for responses just
over a month after they were published.1 5' The regulation that
established ESMA provides:
Before submitting them to the Commission, the Authority
shall conduct open public consultations on draft regulatory
technical standards and analyse the potential related costs
and benefits, unless such consultations and analyses are
disproportionate in relation to the scope and impact of the
draft regulatory technical standards concerned or in
1
relation to the particular urgency of the matter 9
The technical consultations on CRAs were relatively short,
although the documents had been preceded by calls for
evidence " or earlier consultations. ESMA received eleven
responses to its call for evidence on ratings data periodic
requirements,6' and did not disclose how many responses it
157. See
EUROPEAN
SEC.
&
MKTS.
[UTH. (ESMA),
ESMA/2011/302,
(ONSULTATION PAPER: RLELLATORY TECHNICAL STANDARDS ON THE INFORLATION TO
BE PROVIDED To ESMA BY A CREDIT RATING AGENCY IN ITS APPIICATION FOR
REGISTRAT ION ANT CERTICTION AND FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS SYSTEMIC
IMPORTANCE (2011); EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., ESMA/2011/303, (ONSULTATION
PAPER: REGULIATORY TECHNICAL STANDARDS ON THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE OF
CREDIT RIATING METHODOLOGIES WITH THE REQLUIREMENTS SET OTL T IN ARTICLE 8(3)
01 REGULATION (EC) No 1060/2009 (2011); EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH.,
ESMA/2011/304, CONSULTATION PAPER: ESMA'S
)RAFT I REGU-LATORY TECHNICAL
STANDARDS ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE INFORMATION THAT CREDIT RATING
AGENCILS SHALL DISCLOSE IN Acco)RDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11 (2) AND POINT 1 OF PART 11
OF SECTION E OF ANNEX I TO REGL ILATION (EC) No 1060/2 (2011); EUROPEAN SEC. &
MKTS. AUTH., ESMA/2011/305, CONSULTATION PAPER: ESMA'S DRAFT REGULATORY
TECHNICAL STANDARDS ON THE CONTENT AND FORLAT OF RATINGS DATA PERIODIC
REPORTING TO BE SUBMITTED FROM CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2011).
158. See, e.g., EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., ESMA/2011/305, supra note 157, at

2 ("[The European Securities and Markets Authority ("ESMA")] will consider all
comments received by the 21 October 2011 .").
159. European Securities and Markets Authority Regulation, supra note 108, art.
10(1), at 96. Al ticle 10(1) of the regulation also provides that "[r]cgulatol) technical
standards shall be technical, shall not imply strategic decisions or policy choices and
their content shall be delinited by the legislative acts on which they are based." Id.
160. See, e.g., EUROPLAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH.. ESMA/2011/305, supra note 157, at
7 ("ESMA published a 'Call for Evidence on ratings data periodic reporting
requirements' (Re. ESMA/2011/156) on 26 May 2011. The aim of the Call for
Evidence was to collect data and infirmation for a preliminar) assessment of the abovementioned requirements from CRAs, and possibly other interested parties.").
161. See id. ("The Call for Evidence closed on 20.June 2011. ESMA has received 11
responses: 2 fromn associations of financial institutions (banks) and 9 fromh credit rating
agencies.").
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received to the Article 8(3) call for evidence. 16 2 ESMA's website
shows that it received fewer than twenty responses from eleven

organizations to all of the technical CRA consultations. The
European Association of Credit Rating Agencies ("EACRA")
commented:
[G]iven that the status of registered or certified CRA is a
ren,new one and that many stakeholders are not aware of
this important regulatory change, we call on y our esteemed
institution to spread this information more widely,
especially towards users of ratings as defined under the
Regulation. 163
Consultations on complex issues, on the basis of documents
published only in English, and with a limited time frame do not
really seem to be consistent with the ideas of openness and
transparency in the Treaties, even if they are technically in
compliance with the terms of Article 10 of the ESMA
Regulation, which seems to give ESMA some scope to maneuver.
The issues raised by these consultations were undoubtedly
technical, and it would be rational for most citizens to ignore
them. But, as EACRA noted, many users of ratings, who might
be interested in the details of the rules, were likely not aware of

the consultations.
On January 24, 2012, ESMA published a consultation on
draft technical standards on short selling and credit default
swaps.
This was a consultation on the development of
technical standards under a regulation, which had not only not
been published in the Official Journal when the consultation
document appeared, 165 it was not published at the end of the
consultation period, which was set for February 13, 2012. Law
firms and other groups criticized the short consultation

162. See EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS.AUTH., ESMA/2011 /303,.spra note 157, at 5.

163. Letter t-oin Thomas Missong, President, European Ass'n Credit Rating
Agencies (EACRA), and Thomas Morgenstern, Secretary Gen., EACRA, to the
European Securities and Market Authority
(Oct. 21, 2011), available at
I!Ltp://Nw.csla.curopa.cu/Systm/files/2-EA(RA.pdt
164. See EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH.. ESMA/2012/30. (ONSULTATION PAPER:
)RAFT TECHNICAL STANDARDS ON THE REGULATION (EU) xxxx/2012 O
THE
EUROPEAN PARLLAMLNT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHORT SELLING AND (ERTAIN ASPECTS
OF (REDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (2012).

165. See id.at 5 (stating that the regulation was about to be published).
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period.166 A group of trade associations recently suggested that
ESMA risked not complying with better regulation standards
7
because it was being forced to work too quickly.
The development of EU rules relating to CRAs1' s and other
issues in financial regulation raises questions about how the
Treaty principles apply and should apply to actions of these EU
authorities. And transparency matters here because the details
of the rules matter as well as the broad outlines that provide the
context for the details. 169 Financial market participants are in a
better position than consumer groups to track the development
of these detailed rules, but the interests of financial market
participants and consumers often diverge. More effort to try to

move beyond formal transparency to more effective and visible
communication would help citizens to monitor whether
regulatory bodies were deferring too much to the views of
financial market participants.'

7

166. See, e.g., HERBERT SMITH, THE NEW PAN-FUROPEAN REGIME FOR SHORT
SLLLING ANi CREDIT DELIAULT SWAPS: ESMA (ONSULTATION PAPLR ON DRAFT
TECHNICAL STANDARDS 2 (2012).
167. Letter from Ass'n for Fin. Markets in Eur. (AIFME) et al. to Michel Barnier,
Cornmi'r, European C(omm'n et al. Jan. 17, 2012) ("Legislation such as the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Regulation on CDS and Short
Selling requires ESMA to adopt implementing and technical measures within vey) short
timeti-anes. Such demands jeopardise the goal of drafting high quality and credible
regulation.... In the case of the CDS and Short Selling Regulation, lormal
consultation by ESMA is expected to begin in Januar) 2012, with allowance tir a
consultation period of only one month (possibly less). betore ESMA reports to the
European Commission on its recommendations for technical standards by 31 March
2012. In contrast to this three month drafting period-which we believe falls tar short
of the C ommission's better regulation standards tir the ESAs-it appears that there
will then be a seven month period belore the standards are finalised by the
Commission.").
168. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
169. See Letter firom Frederic Drevon, Managing Dir., Region Head of Eur., Middle
East & Mr., Moody's Investors Serv., to Felix Flintriman, Head of Unit, Credit Rating
Agencies, ESMA 1 (Oct. 21 2011), available at htt): /w ,w.esma.europa.eu/systcl/
files MIS
Response to Iralt RTSRegj nfo Fial.pdf ("MIS is concerned that
ESMA is inappropriately expanding the scope of the Regulation by introducing into
EU law, via this RTS. a disclosure regime on ownership of CRAs that was not provided
for in the Regulation.").
170. Mtr the financial crisis policymakers questioned their earlier deference to
arguments that the markets should be allowed to manage themselves. See, e.g., FIN.

[UTH.,
THE T RNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GI OBAL BANKING
(2009), available at http://wwxitsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ttrncrcview.pdf
("An underlying assumption of financial regulation in the US, the UK and across the
world, has been that financial innovation is by definition beneficial, since market
SERVS.
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CONCLUSION
Complete transparency is impossible to achieve. As
transparency increases it produces information overload. The
European Union has committed itself to transparency in the
Treaties, however, so the EU institutions must work to increase
citizens' ability to navigate the information that is available to
them. And the EU institutions should do more to increase access
to information about the development of EU policy, by
implementing the EU commitment to multilingualism more
effectively, and by not allowing crises and technical matters to
divert them from the imperatives of transparency.

discipline will winnow out any unnecessary or value destructive innovations. As a result,
regulators have not considered it their role to judge the value of different financial
products, and they have in general avoided direct product regulation, certainly in
wholesale markets with sophisticated investors.").

